Mykola Zentsev, international security expert, Major General (Ret.)
Negotiations on ending the war are becoming increasingly intertwined with major commercial interests. For Ukraine, this creates a concrete security threat: its resilience and sovereignty may become part of a geopolitical bargain between the aggressor state and partners on whom Ukraine’s defense capabilities directly depend.
U.S.-Russian consultations have included a possible deal involving Lukoil’s foreign assets. According to available information, the issue was raised during Vladimir Putin’s talks with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner on September 5. The assets reportedly include oil fields, refineries, and networks of filling stations in Europe and other regions of the world.
The Financial Times values this portfolio of assets at approximately $20 billion. Possible participants in the consortium reportedly include American investor Todd Boehly, the U.S. government’s Development Finance Corporation (DFC), as well as investors from the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
A situation in which Washington simultaneously determines the sanctions conditions for a sale and, through a government financial institution, may participate in the acquisition of assets creates a potential conflict of interest. This is especially significant when the United States is a key participant in negotiations on ending the war in Ukraine.
This story must be viewed in the broader context of Kyiv’s dependence on U.S. political, financial, and military-technology decisions.
Political Pressure and External Vulnerability
The suspension of U.S. military aid and intelligence sharing in March 2025 demonstrated how quickly diplomatic disagreements can affect Ukraine’s position on the battlefield.
Carnegie Endowment researcher Eric Ciaramella has drawn attention to the asymmetry of the negotiating approach: Ukraine is expected to demonstrate increasing flexibility, while moscow maintains its core demands. Under such conditions, dependence on external assistance can become an instrument for forcing concessions.
Additional vulnerability is created by domestic political scandals and high-profile anti-corruption investigations involving senior officials. Their political consequences extend beyond individual criminal cases and may restrict the government’s freedom of action during international consultations.
The need to fight corruption is unconditional. At the same time, this does not eliminate the risk that internal crises, procedural actions, and information campaigns may be used as additional instruments of external pressure. As a result, Ukraine’s leadership is forced to simultaneously defend the country against Russian aggression, maintain international support, and respond to political attacks inside the country.
Financial Dependence: Allocated Funds Do Not Equal Weapons Received
Delays in defense financing have a concrete price, which Ukraine pays on the battlefield.
According to published information, $910 million under the USAI program became unavailable for new contracting because the relevant budget deadline had expired. This does not mean that all previous commitments disappeared, but it does mean the loss of an opportunity to place additional weapons orders in a timely manner.
Regarding another $400 million aid package, by the end of September, 99.8% of the amount had been covered by contractual commitments. At the same time, delivery of some of the ordered equipment is scheduled through 2029. The long gap between a decision to allocate funds and the actual arrival of weapons at military units creates uncertainty in supplying the front.
For a state fighting a war of attrition, this has strategic significance. Ukraine plans its defense under constant Russian attacks, while the timing of critical resource deliveries is often determined outside Ukraine. Such dependence weakens both military planning and Kyiv’s negotiating position.
Patriot: PAC-2 in the Production Queue and the PAC-3 Shortage
The problem with Patriot is not that Ukraine receives no missiles. The problem is that different types of interceptors have different purposes, production timelines, and levels of availability.
In January 2024, NATO announced a contract worth approximately $5.5 billion for the procurement of up to 1,000 Patriot GEM-T missiles from the PAC-2 family for Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain. Production is being expanded at the COMLOG facility in Schrobenhausen, Germany. This is a European order intended to replenish the allies’ stocks. It does not mean that all of these missiles will be transferred to Ukraine.
Separately, on April 14, 2026, Raytheon announced a $3.7 billion contract for the delivery of GEM-T missiles specifically to Ukraine. Part of the production workload is expected to be handled by the COMLOG facility in Germany. This is an important Ukrainian order, but it concerns PAC-2 GEM-T missiles specifically.
To counter ballistic missiles, Ukraine primarily needs PAC-3 interceptors. Ukraine has received such missiles from Germany, but their quantity remains insufficient to expand protection for cities and critical infrastructure. In July, Ukraine’s representative in Washington reported on negotiations concerning long-term PAC-3 purchases and a possible exchange of positions in the production queue with another customer. Potential deployment of production in Ukraine was estimated to take between one and five years.
This is the core of the problem: production of PAC-2 in Germany and possible future licensing agreements do not address the current shortage of PAC-3 interceptors. Ukraine depends on U.S. production decisions, partners’ stockpiles, order queues, and the political willingness to transfer these interceptors.
In July, Reuters reported that the United States was considering establishing a PAC-3 maintenance center in Europe, but the possibility of full-scale production outside the United States remains a separate and lengthy process.
F-16: Aircraft Delivered Do Not Equal Combat Capability
According to publicly available estimates cited by The War Zone, Ukraine has received approximately 40–50 F-16 fighter jets. The publication also relayed reports that more than half of the fleet may be unavailable for combat missions because of maintenance issues. Some aircraft are abroad for training, while the exact number of aircraft undergoing repairs in Belgium has not been publicly established.
Therefore, the issue is not only the number of aircraft delivered. Ukraine depends on foreign maintenance, spare parts, and technical support. If scheduled maintenance takes months, a nominal increase in the fleet does not translate into a corresponding increase in the number of combat sorties.
Oil Interests and Peace Terms
Washington has expressed concern about Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, linking them to diesel shortages and rising prices. Ukraine continues these attacks because they weaken the economic and logistical potential of the aggressor.
This reveals a fundamental contradiction: for Ukraine, strikes against oil infrastructure are part of its military strategy, while for some partners they create risks for the global fuel market. Halting such strikes without genuinely limiting Russian aggression would deprive Ukraine of one of the few instruments available to influence the adversary’s resource base.
It is against this background that negotiations concerning Lukoil’s assets acquire particular significance. Under the rules of the U.S. sanctions regulator OFAC, any deal requires a separate authorization, a complete severing of the assets’ links to the sanctioned company, and the blocking of funds belonging to Lukoil until the sanctions are lifted.
The key question is whether these restrictions will remain in place during the political bargaining, who will ultimately benefit from the deal, and whether sanctions relief could become part of a broader bargain between Washington and moscow.
Conclusions
If the United States conducts financial negotiations with russia involving tens of billions of dollars without involving Ukraine in determining the terms, this does not mean that Ukraine will automatically agree to capitulation or lose the war.
Even under direct U.S. influence over Kyiv through political, military, and financial leverage, the final outcome will be determined not by backroom agreements but by the balance of forces on the battlefield.
Ukraine cannot be “sold” with a single signature in Washington or moscow if the Ukrainian state retains its ability to govern, society retains its capacity for resistance, and the Armed Forces of Ukraine retain the ability to inflict unacceptable losses on the adversary.
In 2022, the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian military stopped the Russian advance on Kyiv, destroyed the Kremlin’s initial plan, and demonstrated that russia could not automatically achieve its objectives even with a massive resource advantage. Western assistance has had and continues to have enormous importance, but it does not eliminate Ukraine’s agency. The decisions to hold the front, defend cities, and continue the struggle are made by Ukrainian service members and society.
Therefore, any external plan drawn up without taking Kyiv’s position into account may remain merely a political document if it cannot be imposed by force on the battlefield.
At the same time, the danger posed by the configuration of interests described above is real. The combination of U.S.-Russian commercial negotiations, pressure on Ukraine, delays in military assistance, shortages of interceptor missiles, dependence of aviation on foreign maintenance, and demands to limit strikes against Russian oil infrastructure could create conditions for imposing decisions on Kyiv that serve the interests of other states.
Ukraine’s response should be to strengthen its own capabilities: develop domestic defense production, establish a repair base for Western weapons, expand air-defense systems, preserve state governance, and deepen cooperation with European partners.
The stronger Ukraine is on the battlefield, the fewer opportunities any external actor has to bargain over its territory and future.
The decisive factor remains the front. It is there that it will be determined whether russia can impose its terms or will be forced to abandon its maximalist demands. The Ukrainian people, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the state’s ability to continue resisting are the principal actors in this war.
Even a $20 billion agreement between Washington and moscow does not give russia the right to dispose of Ukraine. No oil assets, financial arrangements, or diplomatic structures can replace actual control over Ukrainian territory.
Ukraine may face pressure, temporary shortages of resources, and political setbacks, but its defeat is not predetermined.
The criterion for any international agreement should not be the speed at which it is concluded or the profit generated from the sale of Russian assets, but Ukraine’s ability to preserve its sovereignty, protect its citizens, and prevent a new war after the formal cessation of hostilities.
As long as the Ukrainian army holds the front and Ukrainian society retains the will to resist, Ukraine cannot be handed over to russia without its consent. The final decision will not be made in the offices of Washington or moscow, but in Ukraine — on the battlefield, within society, and through the state’s ability to endure.