On September 18–20, 2026, Russia will hold elections to the State Duma of the IX convocation, electing 450 deputies under a mixed system: 225 through party lists and 225 in single-member constituencies. Formally, the campaign is only gaining momentum, but one month before the vote, its main contours can already be outlined with considerable confidence.

They consist of three interconnected processes: the struggle within the Kremlin vertical for control over the electoral process, the ruling party’s strategy of achieving a “controlled, rather than maximum” result, and the elimination of any genuine political alternative.

1. Who Actually Controls the Process: The Crisis of the Kiriyenko Model

For many years, domestic policy in Russia, particularly the system of “managed elections,” was shaped by First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko. His influence was based not on public politics, but on his reputation as a political operator capable of guaranteeing the required result through administrative structures, regional elites, and a controlled digital environment.

This model suffered a systemic blow following a series of foreign-policy failures, most notably defeats suffered by pro-Putin forces in Moldova and, particularly sensitively for the Kremlin, in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán, Moscow’s key ally within the EU, lost. These failures have been publicly associated with Kiriyenko’s political bloc, casting doubt on his status as an “indispensable” manager.

The FSB has taken advantage of this situation. The security bloc, particularly the FSB’s Second Service under Alexei Sedov, has begun taking control of instruments previously associated with Kiriyenko’s “managed” model: the digital environment, Telegram, VPN services, payment systems, and the promotion of the state-run MAX messenger.

A situation of “responsibility without control” is emerging: Kiriyenko formally remains responsible for the electoral result and political stability, while having increasingly less control over the environment in which that result is supposed to be achieved.

The practical consequence for the 2026 campaign is more chaotic and harsher administration, a greater role for the security apparatus, pressure on “undesirable” candidates, restrictions on communication platforms, and the continued use of Kiriyenko’s traditional political technologies. Any campaign failures, including low turnout or poor results in individual regions, could become grounds for further redistribution of power away from the political bloc.

2. United Russia’s Strategy: Not Maximum, but a Controlled Result

On June 28, 2026, the first stage of the 23rd Congress of United Russia was held. It approved the federal party list headed by Dmitry Medvedev. The list also included Sergei Lavrov, Sergei Sobyanin, war correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny, Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, and Yunarmiya head Vladislav Golovin.

Each name symbolically covers a separate electoral segment: confrontation with the West, the administrative resources of major cities, military propaganda, social and humanitarian rhetoric, and militarized youth policy.

The main campaign slogans, including “Being for Putin is the basic minimum” and “Russia cannot be defeated on the battlefield,” are built not around a political program, but around personal loyalty to Putin and support for the war against Ukraine.

The second stage of the congress, scheduled for August 22, is expected to approve a “People’s Program” containing socioeconomic promises intended to mobilize voters during the final stage of the campaign.

Behind this facade of consolidation, however, there is a worrying trend for the authorities. According to a VTsIOM poll conducted on June 26, support for United Russia had fallen to 33.8%, down 1.7 percentage points in one week. New People stood at 12%, the Communist Party at 10.7%, and the LDPR at 9.4%.

The Kremlin’s lower expectations are already effectively being acknowledged within the Russian information environment. The authorities are no longer counting on a repeat of United Russia’s 2021 result, when the party received 49.82%. Instead, they are seeking to secure a result that is controlled and sufficiently plausible not to undermine the legitimacy of the system.

The formula for this campaign is therefore not to win by a landslide, but to simulate a convincing victory using the familiar toolkit: administrative resources, personalization around Putin, wartime rhetoric, and social promises.

3. Clearing the Field: Eliminating the Only Anti-War Alternative

At the same time, the final stage of narrowing genuine competition is underway. Of the 17 parties legally entitled to participate, 11 submitted candidate lists without collecting signatures. They include the parliamentary heavyweights United Russia, the Communist Party, LDPR, A Just Russia – For Truth, and New People, as well as Yabloko, Rodina, the Pensioners’ Party, Communists of Russia, the Greens, and the Party of Direct Democracy.

The story of Yabloko is the most revealing episode of the campaign in recent weeks. It was the only registered party with an openly anti-war platform, “For Peace and Freedom!” Following its registration by the Central Election Commission on July 29, the party began rapidly increasing its support.

On August 10, the Supreme Court of Russia, acting on a lawsuit filed by the nationalist Rodina party, canceled Yabloko’s registration on the federal ballot. The formal grounds were allegations of copyright violations, including the use of an image of a dove and a photograph featuring a tank in a sunflower field, as well as alleged foreign financing.

On August 17, the Supreme Court’s appellate chamber upheld the decision. At least 60 party supporters were detained outside the courthouse.

That same day, a court in Pskov sentenced Yabloko deputy chairman Lev Shlosberg to more than 11 years in prison for calls to end the fighting.

According to Meduza, citing sources close to the Presidential Administration, the decision to remove Yabloko from the election was personally approved by Putin after the party’s ratings began to rise. The original campaign scenario reportedly envisaged the participation only of “controlled” political actors.

This is the first time in modern Russian history that a party already registered to participate in an election has been removed from the electoral race.

As a result, voters opposed to the war are left without any legal option to express their position on the ballot.

4. The Contours That Can Already Be Identified

The available data as of mid-August provide a sufficiently clear picture of the upcoming campaign:

• The format is predetermined. These will not be competitive elections, but a managed procedure with a predetermined winner, United Russia, accompanied by a loyal circle of satellite parties such as the Communist Party, LDPR, A Just Russia, and New People, creating the appearance of pluralism without a genuine alternative to the current course.
• The Kremlin’s objective is not a record result like that of 2021, but a plausible, controlled victory that does not undermine the legitimacy of the system amid declining support for United Russia and the growth of protest-oriented voters, particularly those supporting New People and the Communist Party.
• The internal elite struggle for control over the electoral process, between Kiriyenko and the FSB security bloc, increases the risk of administrative failures and is likely to strengthen the repressive component of the campaign, including not only public mobilization but also the direct removal of undesirable political actors.
• The anti-war alternative has been eliminated before the active campaign phase even began. Yabloko’s removal from the election leaves part of Russian society opposed to the war without political representation and turns the September vote into a referendum without a genuine choice.
• Socioeconomic rhetoric, centered on the “People’s Program” announced for August 22, will become the principal mobilization tool during the final stage of the campaign, compensating for weaker confidence in wartime narratives among part of the electorate.

Taken together, these elements point to a campaign designed not as a competition for votes, but as a demonstration of the system’s controlled stability amid a prolonged war and growing internal turbulence within the ruling vertical.

The 2026 State Duma elections are therefore less about winning than about demonstrating that the Kremlin still controls the political system.