The Lukashenko regime is becoming increasingly integrated into Russia’s military machine, seeking to demonstrate its loyalty to Moscow while doing so in a way that avoids direct armed confrontation with Ukraine.
Appeasing Moscow Through Recruitment, Not Mobilization
The clearest example is the emergence of a recruitment platform within Belarus’s national domain zone openly calling on citizens to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to participate in the war against Ukraine. Registration within this domain zone is controlled by a presidential security service responsible for protecting state secrets, meaning the project effectively has state approval.
The platform is operated by the Russian recruitment agency “Bratsky Syndicate,” which offers Belarusians a one-time payment of approximately $28,000 and monthly compensation exceeding $3,100, along with additional payments for killing civilians and attacking positions, “combat allowances” during offensives, and destroyed equipment.
Significantly, this is not being done through Belarusian mobilization, but by covertly encouraging volunteers to join a foreign army. Although Belarusian criminal law formally provides for up to 10 years in prison for mercenary activity, in practice the law-enforcement system appears to ignore Belarusians serving in the Russian Armed Forces, while prosecuting only those who have fought as members of private military companies.
This is the essence of Minsk’s balancing strategy: supplying the Kremlin with “cannon fodder” through Belarusians themselves, without assuming responsibility for official participation in the war.
According to available estimates, approximately 2,900 Belarusian citizens had passed through the Russian army by 2026, at least 440 of whom had been killed.
The same logic can be seen in the education system. For the 2026–2027 academic year, Belarus is introducing drone-operation training for boys and tactical medicine for girls, while moving some training to military bases, where schoolchildren will undergo 10-day field exercises. This appears to be long-term reserve formation rather than preparation for an immediate Belarusian offensive.
“Social Parasites” Instead of Combat-Ready Troops
Another element of this strategy is the way Lukashenko is reinforcing the contingent on the Ukrainian border.
According to the Belarusian STV television channel, around 500 agricultural workers labeled “unscrupulous” by the authorities were sent to two-month military training on Lukashenko’s personal orders. Earlier, the presidential administration had stated that “undisciplined workers, alcoholics and idlers” would be transferred to the Ministry of Defense to establish “iron discipline.”
Military-age specialists and agricultural machinery operators are being assigned to special operations units, where they receive firearms, tactical, engineering and medical training. After completing the course, they are expected to be deployed specifically to the Ukrainian border for training and combat-related tasks.
The level of preparation is telling: after only one week of training, such personnel can reportedly learn to operate grenade launchers and machine guns and then immediately be transferred to special operations forces.
At the same time, pressure from Moscow is not weakening. According to The Wall Street Journal, Putin has been increasing pressure on Lukashenko to secure more active Belarusian involvement in the conflict, while the Kremlin may have threatened to reduce financial support if Minsk refuses.
In parallel, the Belarusian Ministry of Defense conducted exercises in the Grodno region bordering Poland and Lithuania, practicing the mobilization of citizens and transportation while checking the records of several thousand reservists.
Lukashenko has previously stated that in the event of war, Belarus could increase the size of its armed forces and security structures to 500,000 personnel. This figure remains primarily a declarative demonstration of potential rather than evidence of actual readiness.
Demonstrating Readiness Without Real Readiness for War
Along the border with Ukraine, Belarus is actively expanding its military infrastructure. The construction of new border posts, training grounds, a base for airborne troops and relay stations for UAV control creates a sense of déjà vu from 2022.
In 2026, Belarus plans to build five new border-post complexes along the Ukrainian border, the same number as were constructed in 2025. One of them is located just 860 meters from the Ukrainian border.
A military settlement is also being built on the site of a former tourist base approximately 40 kilometers from the border. It is designed as a training center capable of accommodating an airborne brigade.
Particularly notable is the work on drone communications. Five UAV relay stations are being installed along the border, capable of operating through GSM, satellite and MESH channels. Testing of these systems has already been observed when individual Shahed drones appeared over the Kyiv region while helicopters were simultaneously operating along the Belarusian border.
Such communications allow drones such as Shahed, Gerbera and Molniya to maintain stable control at distances of up to 220 kilometers.
Dams and embankments are also being constructed. Although formally civilian infrastructure, they effectively create routes for the rapid movement of heavy military equipment.
Even here, however, Minsk is limiting itself to partial measures. The decision to call up reserve officers up to the age of 27 who have not completed mandatory military service is not a conventional mobilization, but rather the creation of a personnel reserve for the coming year.
Why Minsk Is Reluctant to Participate Directly
According to the Andromeda Information and Analytical Center, Belarus currently lacks sufficient forces and resources to launch an offensive against Ukraine from the Belarusian direction. The deployment time for such forces would be too long, and there are no clear signs of preparations for the immediate transfer of troops to the border.
It is also significant that the main planning resources of the Russian General Staff are concentrated not on the Ukrainian direction, but on the northwestern theater, particularly around Gotland, Narva and the Suwałki area. This indicates that the Kremlin is not currently assigning Minsk the task of opening a second front against Ukraine.
Belarus is demonstrating loyalty to the Kremlin through methods that are as visible as possible while remaining relatively “safe” for the regime.
Recruiting volunteers instead of conducting its own mobilization, building infrastructure instead of actually deploying troops, preparing reserves instead of sending conscripts to the front, and now sending “unsuitable” workers to the border instead of combat-ready units all represent an imitation of active participation in the war without exposing the regime to the risks of direct involvement.
Direct participation in combat operations against Ukraine remains a red line for Lukashenko. He has so far been unwilling to cross it, despite growing pressure from Moscow.
To satisfy that pressure, Minsk is instead using the human resources considered least valuable to the regime itself.
Belarus remains caught between appeasing the Kremlin and fearing open war.