The Balkans are once again becoming a point of risk for Europe, but the crisis can still be prevented.

While Western attention is focused on russia’s war against Ukraine, another potential source of instability is emerging in the Balkans. Developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina are increasingly moving beyond the framework of an internal political crisis and acquiring significance for European security as a whole.

What civilian observers describe as “another political escalation in the Balkans” is, in intelligence terms, a classic influence operation aimed at opening a “second front” of destabilization against NATO and Europe as a whole.

I have had to work in this region on numerous occasions. The Balkans are not called “Europe’s powder keg” without reason, as local political conflicts have repeatedly become catalysts for larger crises. This is why the current developments in the region deserve considerably more attention than they are receiving today.

THE FRAGILE PEACE AFTER DAYTON

To understand the logic of current events, it is worth returning to 1995, when the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed under U.S. mediation. It ended the Bosnian War and created a complex model of coexistence between two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited predominantly by Bosniaks-Muslims and Croats-Catholics, and the autonomous Republika Srpska, with its administrative center in Banja Luka and a predominantly Orthodox Serb population.

Both regions have their own governments, as well as shared state institutions: a collective Presidency, parliament, judiciary, and army. Oversight of this constitutional arrangement is entrusted to the High Representative, who has the authority to overturn decisions by local radicals, as well as to the European Union peacekeeping contingent, EUFOR.

For three decades, this structure, despite all its difficulties, has made it possible to avoid a new armed conflict.

However, its vulnerabilities are increasingly being exploited by Moscow-oriented political forces advocating the maximum weakening of central authority in Sarajevo.

HOW russia IS STRENGTHENING ITS INFLUENCE

One of the Kremlin’s main allies in the region is Milorad Dodik, President of Republika Srpska and a long-standing and openly pro-Putin politician. He regularly visits Moscow and uses his political influence to block decisions by the central government in Sarajevo.

In particular, during 2026, the authorities in Banja Luka adopted a series of decisions rejecting the rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and boycotting central institutions. The next step could be an attempt to restore a separate Serb army, which would contradict the provisions of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement.

Moscow traditionally supports such processes politically, informationally, and diplomatically, because for the Kremlin any escalation in the Balkans means diverting Europe’s and NATO’s attention and resources away from the Russian-Ukrainian war.

To facilitate this, Russian intelligence services have established an infrastructure of support on the territory of Republika Srpska for what is known as “salami secession”: the gradual erosion of sovereignty instead of a single, outright declaration of independence.

In particular, during 2026, the authorities in Banja Luka adopted a number of decisions rejecting rulings by the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and boycotting the work of central government institutions. The next step could be an attempt to restore a separate army of Republika Srpska, which would contradict the provisions of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement.

Psychological pressure tools are also being employed. One example was the mass questioning by Republika Srpska police of 26 employees of the Srebrenica Memorial Center after the publication of a report on genocide denial. Such actions are intended to demonstrate to local Muslims the inability of the central government in Sarajevo to protect them.

At the same time, a paramilitary reserve is reportedly being developed. Under the cover of “Orthodox brotherhoods,” motorcycle clubs, and sports organizations, a network of radicals has allegedly been established whose members have undergone training by Russian instructors and are prepared for armed provocations along the ethnic dividing line.

An important component of Russian influence in the Balkans is an extensive network of intelligence, information, and cyber activities. In particular, facilities were reportedly discovered near the village of Radenka where, according to law-enforcement authorities, Russian instructors trained radicals for mass unrest. Russian citizens were also detained in connection with the organization of this network.

A separate role is played by the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in the city of Niš, which Western experts have repeatedly described as a possible base for electronic intelligence and coordination of operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

At the same time, large-scale cyberattacks have continued and have been attributed to the Russian hacking groups Midnight Blizzard and Forest Blizzard. More than 28,000 such attacks were reportedly recorded against the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy alone. Information support for these activities is provided by media outlets such as RT Balkan, as well as propaganda-distribution networks linked to Russian intelligence services.

THE “SERBIAN WORLD” PROJECT

The destabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not solely a consequence of Russian influence. Official Belgrade also has its own strategic interest in supporting separatist tendencies in Republika Srpska. This follows from the concept of the “Serbian World” (“Srpski svet”), which many analysts view as a modern political interpretation of the idea of “Greater Serbia.”

For Serbia’s political leadership, Republika Srpska remains an important element of regional policy. The threat of its secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina can be used by Belgrade as additional leverage in negotiations with Brussels and Washington, particularly in the context of the Kosovo issue.

At the same time, the development of joint infrastructure, economic, and security projects between Serbia and Republika Srpska is contributing to the formation of an increasingly integrated political and economic space even without any formal change to internationally recognized borders.

An important role in promoting Russian influence in the Balkans is played by the Russian Orthodox Church, which maintains close relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Religious rhetoric is used to spread narratives about a “common Pan-Slavic and Orthodox civilization” allegedly threatened by the West and NATO. Within this framework, the separatist aspirations of Republika Srpska’s leadership are presented not as violations of international law, but as a struggle for “traditional values” and the defense of the Orthodox faith.

Religious infrastructure is also one of the instruments of Russian influence in the region. Under the cover of pilgrimage centers, cultural and educational foundations, and religious exhibitions, Russian intelligence influence networks reportedly operate within Republika Srpska.

Links between monasteries and religious brotherhoods in russia and Republika Srpska facilitate covert financing, the transfer of logistical resources, and the concealment of Russian operatives under the guise of “monks” or “pilgrims.”

Taken together, these processes increase the risk of a new crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

POSSIBLE ESCALATION SCENARIOS AND PREVENTIVE STEPS FOR THE WEST

A number of indicators suggest that the situation is approaching a critical threshold.

Most experts identify Brčko District as a potential point of escalation. It divides the territory of Republika Srpska into two parts and remains under the direct control of the central authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and an international supervisor.

Among the scenarios for military escalation, experts most often consider an attempt by Serb forces to establish a corridor through Brčko to connect their eastern and western territories.

Any forceful attempt to alter the status quo would inevitably have international consequences. Since neighboring Croatia is a NATO member, the Alliance would be forced to respond by deploying forces to the Balkans and diverting resources from Europe’s Baltic and eastern flanks.

Preventing a new crisis would cost significantly less than dealing with one after it begins. This requires strengthening the international security presence in the most vulnerable areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, increasing sanctions pressure on those undermining the Dayton arrangements, and intensifying cooperation among European intelligence services in countering Russian influence networks.

The Balkans cannot be left out of focus. European history has repeatedly demonstrated that Balkan crises rarely remain purely regional. That is why it is important today to prevent Bosnia and Herzegovina from becoming another arena for Russia’s geopolitical confrontation with the West.

Mykola Zentsev, international security expert, retired Major General

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