Tokyo is moving away from a purely defensive model and building a network of partnerships across the region in response to China’s growing power.

In September 2026, three Japanese F-2A fighter jets arrived in India for the first time. Together with Kawasaki C-2 transport aircraft and more than 100 military personnel, they are taking part in the Veer Guardian-2026 tactical air exercise at Jodhpur Air Base. India is participating with Rafale, Su-30MKI and LCA Tejas aircraft.

At first glance, this is an ordinary bilateral exercise. In reality, the deployment of three Japanese combat aircraft thousands of kilometres from the Japanese archipelago demonstrates a much broader process. Japan is gradually moving from the post-war model of territorial self-defence toward active participation in shaping the military and political balance across the Indo-Pacific. China is the main driver behind this strategic shift.

CHINA IS CHANGING JAPAN

For decades, Japan’s security rested on the Self-Defense Forces and its military alliance with the United States. Tokyo remained an economic giant while deliberately limiting its military and political role. That era is coming to an end.

In 2026, China’s official defence budget stands at 1.94 trillion yuan ($289.1 billion), an increase of 6.9%. China continues the large-scale modernisation of its naval, air, missile, space and cyber capabilities. For Japan, this military power is literally next door.

The dispute over the Senkaku Islands, claimed by China, remains unresolved. Chinese ships and aircraft regularly operate near Japanese territory.

The Taiwan Strait remains a potential theatre of major military conflict. Japan’s Yonaguni Island is only about 110 kilometres from Taiwan. A possible conflict over Taiwan has therefore long ceased to be an abstract crisis somewhere in Southeast Asia for Tokyo.

Japan is responding with its own military build-up. Defence spending increased from approximately ¥6.8 trillion ($44.06 billion) in fiscal 2023 to around ¥9 trillion ($58.31 billion) in 2026. Priorities include long-range strike systems, drones, air and missile defence, space capabilities and strengthening the southwestern direction closest to Taiwan.

But the most significant change is taking place beyond Japan itself. Tokyo has effectively concluded that defending Japan only around the Japanese islands is insufficient. A favourable strategic environment must be created at a much greater distance.

This is how a new geography of Japanese security is emerging.

INDIA: JAPAN REACHES THE INDIAN OCEAN

The Veer Guardian-2026 exercise is only the visible part of a much deeper rapprochement between Japan and India.

On 20 August, the defence ministers of the two countries agreed on new areas of military cooperation, including joint exercises, special forces cooperation, maritime security, defence technologies and the exchange of security assessments.

One specific area is Japan’s UNICORN integrated ship communication system. Its transfer is expected to become the first project involving the transfer of Japanese defence equipment to India.

Tokyo has also proposed exploring the possibility of Japanese Self-Defense Forces using Indian training ranges.

Even more importantly, Japan and India agreed to expand cooperation with third countries, particularly Southeast Asian states, and deepen cooperation within the Quad, the informal strategic grouping of the United States, Japan, India and Australia.

This is no longer diplomatic symbolism. A framework for genuine military interoperability is emerging.

India, however, will not become a conventional Japanese ally. New Delhi traditionally maintains strategic autonomy and its own relations with Beijing and Moscow.

But geography cannot be changed.

Japan is located on China’s Pacific flank. India controls strategic space in the Indian Ocean, through which critical maritime routes for the Chinese economy pass.

The Tokyo-New Delhi axis is therefore gradually becoming one of the key elements of the regional balance.

THE PHILIPPINES: THE FRONT LINE

Japan’s strategy is most clearly visible in the Philippines.

In 2026, the Reciprocal Access Agreement entered into force, creating a legal framework for Japanese military personnel to operate in the Philippines and Philippine forces to operate in Japan.

At the same time, an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement was signed, providing a mechanism for mutual logistical support. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are already participating in the field component of the large-scale US-Philippines Balikatan exercises.

Tokyo is also helping Manila develop surveillance capabilities. Japan’s Official Security Assistance programme, established in 2023, provides military equipment and infrastructure to partner countries to strengthen their defence capabilities. The Philippines became one of its first recipients.

Japan is providing coastal surveillance systems, radars and other equipment required to monitor maritime and airspace activity.

Geography explains this interest. The Philippines lies between the South China Sea and the western Pacific, while the Luzon Strait separates the country from Taiwan.

In effect, Japan is helping create an additional sensor and logistical layer along one of the most important potential routes for the Chinese navy to enter the Pacific.

VIETNAM: A PARTNER WITHOUT A MILITARY ALLIANCE

Vietnam traditionally avoids military blocs. But its territorial disputes in the South China Sea make Hanoi a natural partner for Tokyo on maritime security.

In July 2026, the defence ministers of the two countries agreed to expand cooperation between their land, maritime and air forces, military training, port calls, cyber cooperation and defence technologies.

The two sides have also begun discussions on possible joint development and production of high-speed landing craft.

This is a significant change. Japan is gradually moving from simply transferring equipment to partners toward developing joint defence-industrial projects with them.

INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA: MARITIME GATES BETWEEN TWO OCEANS

Another direction of Japanese activity is Indonesia.

In 2026, the two countries signed a Defence Cooperation Arrangement. At the same time, substantive discussions began on the possible transfer of Japanese Asagiri-class destroyers to Indonesia.

The issue is not simply the ships. Discussions also cover crew training, maintenance, support and operation. This represents the creation of a long-term military link between the two countries.

Indonesia has particular geographic importance. The Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits are major gateways between the Pacific and Indian oceans. Maritime routes critical to the economies of East Asia, including China, pass through this area.

Malaysia is located nearby. Japan is developing naval exercises, exchanges of experience and an OSA programme with Kuala Lumpur. Japanese ships conduct joint training with the Royal Malaysian Navy in the South China Sea.

Neither Jakarta nor Kuala Lumpur seeks to join an anti-China military bloc. Tokyo does not require them to do so.

It needs partners capable of better controlling their own waters, exchanging information, operating with Japanese forces and, in a crisis, complicating the freedom of action of any state seeking to establish military dominance in the region.

AUSTRALIA: A DIFFERENT LEVEL OF PARTNERSHIP

The Australian direction is already much closer to full military integration.

Tokyo and Canberra are expanding joint exercises, intelligence sharing, logistical cooperation and defence-industrial collaboration.

In April 2026, Australia signed contracts for its first three frigates based on the modernised Japanese Mogami design. The first ship is scheduled to be delivered to the Royal Australian Navy in 2029. The new frigates will have a range of up to 10,000 nautical miles and 32 vertical launch cells.

For Japan, this is a historic breakthrough. A country that for decades effectively refrained from major arms exports is becoming a supplier of an advanced combat platform to one of the United States’ key allies.

NOT AN “ASIAN NATO”, BUT A NETWORK

It would be misleading to call the emerging system an “Asian NATO”.

India will not abandon its strategic autonomy. Vietnam is unlikely to join military blocs, while Indonesia and Malaysia are also not interested in a formal anti-China coalition.

Tokyo understands this perfectly.

Japan is therefore building not a bloc, but a network.

With one country, it conducts aircraft exercises. With another, it provides radars. With a third, it cooperates on naval capabilities. With a fourth, logistics. With a fifth, defence production. With a sixth, intelligence and operational cooperation.

Above this structure stands Japan’s military alliance with the United States and the Quad framework, which includes the United States, Japan, Australia and India.

A distinctive strategic arc is gradually appearing on the map:

Japan → Philippines → Vietnam → Malaysia → Indonesia → Australia → India

This is not a continuous front against China. All these states have different interests and different relationships with Beijing.

But they share one fundamental interest: preventing any single state from gaining the ability to dictate the rules governing maritime routes across the Indo-Pacific.

CHINA HAS THE LARGER FLEET. JAPAN IS BUILDING THE LARGER NETWORK

This is the logic behind Japan’s strategy.

Tokyo cannot, and probably will not attempt to, match China ship for ship, missile for missile or soldier for soldier.

But Japan has another advantage: the ability to build partnerships.

The United States, Australia, India, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and other states have different levels of relations with Tokyo. But they are gradually becoming connected through exercises, technology, surveillance systems, logistics and defence production.

The future balance of power in Asia will therefore be determined not only by how many ships China builds.

An equally important question will be how many states can simultaneously observe the same battlespace, exchange information, support one another and operate together.

In this sense, Japan’s strategy can be summarised simply:

China has the larger fleet. Japan is trying to build the larger network.

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR UKRAINE

At first glance, events in the Indian and Pacific oceans appear far removed from the Russian-Ukrainian war.

In reality, the two theatres are becoming increasingly interconnected.

Russia and China are deepening their strategic cooperation. North Korea has become a direct supplier of weapons for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Moscow is providing Pyongyang with technology and political support.

European and Asian security systems no longer exist separately.

Japan recognised this earlier than many others. This is why Tokyo has become one of Ukraine’s most consistent Asian partners while simultaneously accelerating its own military rearmament.

Japan’s experience is important for Ukraine for another reason.

Future security will not necessarily be built exclusively through large formal military alliances. It can emerge as a network of bilateral and multilateral agreements: joint weapons production, intelligence sharing, logistics, mutual access to infrastructure, technology programmes, joint exercises and weapons standardisation.

For Ukraine, which after the war will remain on the eastern border of the European security space, this model has practical significance.

Ukraine needs not only political declarations of support, but dozens of concrete military links with states for which Ukraine’s security is part of their own security.

This is precisely what Japan is doing in Asia.

THREE FIGHTERS AS A SYMBOL OF A MAJOR STRATEGIC SHIFT

The three F-2A aircraft that arrived at the Indian air base in Jodhpur in September 2026 will not change the regional balance of power by themselves.

But they clearly demonstrate the direction of change.

Ten years ago, such a deployment of Japanese combat aircraft far beyond Japanese territory would have been politically unusual.

Today, it is becoming part of a new normal.

Japanese fighters in India. Radars in the Philippines. Naval cooperation with Vietnam and Malaysia. Possible Japanese destroyers for Indonesia. Frigates based on a Japanese design for Australia.

Individually, these are separate programmes.

Together, they form a new strategic geography.

Japan is no longer simply defending its own archipelago. It is gradually becoming one of the architects of the deterrence system in the Indo-Pacific.

And this, rather than the number of fighters deployed to Jodhpur, is the main signal to Beijing.

The key facts of the final version are confirmed by official sources: India confirmed that Veer Guardian-2026 will take place from 9 to 22 September with F-2A, Rafale, Su-30MKI and Tejas aircraft, while Japan’s Ministry of Defense described it as the first deployment of JASDF fighter aircraft to India. Japan-India agreements on UNICORN, training ranges, maritime security and cooperation with third countries have also been documented by Tokyo.

Other developments have also been confirmed, including the RAA, ACSA and Balikatan cooperation with the Philippines, expanded defence cooperation with Vietnam, discussions on Asagiri-class destroyers with Indonesia and naval cooperation with Malaysia.

In April 2026, Australia contracted its first three frigates based on the modernised Mogami design, with the first delivery planned for 2029.

The figures also demonstrate the scale of the strategic shift: Japan’s defence budget has reached approximately ¥9 trillion, while China’s official defence budget for 2026 stands at 1.94 trillion yuan, 6.9% higher than the previous year.

The strategic conclusion is that Japan is effectively testing a security model that could become one of the defining models of the next decade.

This is not the creation of a new NATO and not the formation of a rigid anti-China bloc.

Tokyo is building a network of states connected by joint exercises, logistics, intelligence sharing, defence technologies, weapons production and access to military infrastructure.

Such a system makes it possible to bring together countries with different foreign policies around a specific interest: preventing China from establishing military dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

The world is increasingly entering a period in which, alongside traditional alliances, smaller coalitions and bilateral military agreements will emerge around specific threats and potential theatres of confrontation.

For Ukraine, this process has direct implications.

The Russian-Ukrainian war is protracted, while the prospects for its rapid diplomatic settlement remain limited. Ukraine therefore also needs to build not only a system of political support, but a network of long-term military relationships with the United Kingdom, Poland, the Nordic and Baltic states, Germany and other partners.

Japan could become a separate promising direction.

Today, Ukrainian-Japanese cooperation is primarily political, technological, financial and economic. But amid the growing convergence of Russia, China and North Korea, it is logical to expect the defence component of this relationship to become stronger over time.

Ukraine’s experience of modern warfare, drones, air defence, electronic warfare and the battlefield use of technology has practical value for Japan, while Japanese technological and industrial capabilities could be important for Ukraine.

Japan’s “arc” is therefore important for Ukraine as evidence of a broader trend: Ukraine’s future security system may consist not of one major alliance, but of a whole set of interconnected military partnerships, each adding a separate element of deterrence against Russia.

Mykola Zentsev, international security expert, Major General (Ret.), Armed Forces of Ukraine.