The right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) received 43.8% of the vote in the 6 September elections to the parliament of Saxony-Anhalt. This was the party’s best result in its history. AfD won 39 of the 83 seats, falling three seats short of an absolute majority.

In the 2025 federal elections, AfD received 20.8% of the vote and won 152 seats, becoming the second-largest political force in the Bundestag. The Saxony-Anhalt election demonstrated that the party has entered a new stage: AfD is no longer simply increasing its parliamentary representation, but is moving closer to the possibility of forming a government.

For Ukraine, the issue is not simply the strengthening of the political right. The key question is which of these forces are capable of changing European policy toward Russia, NATO and support for Ukraine.

Germany as the Main Test

Germany remains the largest economy in the EU and one of Ukraine’s key European military and financial partners. Therefore, changes in Berlin’s political balance have implications far beyond Germany.

AfD advocates ending military support for Ukraine, restoring relations with Moscow and revising the sanctions policy. The 6 September regional election demonstrated the scale of its electoral support. Compared with the 2021 election, AfD’s result in Saxony-Anhalt increased by 23 percentage points to 43.8%. At the same time, the CDU vote fell by 19.9 percentage points to 17.2%.

AfD’s political isolation remains the main barrier to its access to government. However, after the Saxony-Anhalt election, this barrier is facing a practical test.

AfD won 39 seats, while 42 are required for a majority. The left-populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) won another five seats. BSW representatives have not ruled out negotiations with AfD. This is critically important for Ukraine. The two politically different forces share positions on ending military support for Kyiv, criticizing sanctions and improving relations with Russia.

The risk is not limited to the possibility of AfD entering federal government. A different effect may emerge much earlier. Under pressure from AfD’s growing electorate, traditional parties may begin adjusting their policies on migration, energy, defence spending and aid to Ukraine.

For Kyiv, this means that the political cost of each subsequent aid package will increase.

The Right Is Not Synonymous with Pro-Russian Forces

It would be wrong to mechanically equate Europe’s rightward shift with a pro-Russian course.

Italy under Giorgia Meloni demonstrates a different model. A strict migration policy, national conservatism and criticism of some EU policies are combined with support for NATO and Ukraine.

Another model is represented by Hungary and Slovakia, where national-populist forces take a much more critical position on sanctions against Russia and military support for Kyiv.

AfD, Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) and parts of France’s radical right represent a third model, in which anti-Ukrainian, anti-sanctions or pro-Russian rhetoric is significantly stronger.

A rightward shift in itself is not a gift to Moscow. It becomes one when it transforms into anti-Atlantic policy, blocks European decisions and leads to the abandonment of support for Ukraine.

France as a Strategic Risk

The French scenario could potentially be no less dangerous than the German one. The National Rally remains one of the main contenders for power, while its position on Ukraine differs significantly from the course of the current French leadership.

France’s importance is determined not only by the scale of its assistance to Ukraine. Paris has nuclear weapons, a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, one of Europe’s most powerful armed forces and a central role in shaping European defence policy.

A change in France’s position on Ukraine would have a systemic effect. It could influence European defence initiatives, sanctions policy, military assistance and discussions about future security guarantees.

In 2026, the issue of Ukraine is increasingly becoming part of the domestic political struggle among the French right. For Kyiv, the danger is not only the possibility of a direct halt to French assistance. An equally serious risk is the gradual transformation of Ukraine from an issue of European security into an object of domestic political bargaining.

Italy as a Different Model of Right-Wing Government

The Italian example disproves the idea that right-wing governments are automatically pro-Russian.

Meloni’s government continues to support Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic security system. At the same time, parts of the right-wing political spectrum oppose further military support for Kyiv.

The main risk for Ukraine in Italy is not an immediate change in foreign policy, but the gradual increase in the domestic political cost of supporting Ukraine.

This is an important model for Europe as a whole. A government may remain formally pro-Ukrainian while part of its electoral base gradually moves in a different direction.

Austria and the Netherlands

Austria’s FPÖ is a much more complicated case for Ukraine. The party has traditionally appealed to Austrian neutrality and takes a considerably softer position toward Moscow. Its participation in shaping government policy could strengthen the camp within the EU that opposes sanctions and expanded military support for Ukraine.

The Netherlands is important primarily as an active military partner of Kyiv. Here, a rightward shift does not automatically imply a pro-Russian course. The decisive factors remain the composition of the coalition, its attitude toward NATO and its willingness to continue military programmes for Ukraine.

This difference between countries is precisely why European right-wing forces cannot be viewed as a single political bloc.

Support for Ukraine Will Not End, but It May Slow Down

European support for Ukraine is becoming increasingly less dependent on the decision of a single government.

According to the latest Ukraine Support Tracker data from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, published in August 2026, Europe significantly increased new allocations to Ukraine in May and June. Through the Ukraine Support Loan mechanism alone, European institutions allocated almost €11 billion during those two months.

In March and April, Germany separately provided €4.2 billion in military assistance, primarily for air defence and unmanned systems. The United Kingdom allocated €1.3 billion, while Norway provided €600 million.

Therefore, a scenario in which the arrival of right-wing forces in several countries immediately ends European support for Ukraine is unlikely.

The real risk is a loss of speed.

For Ukraine, overall amounts are not the only issue. Specific air-defence systems, ammunition, long-range weapons, armoured vehicles, defence-production financing, joint procurement, military training and the sanctions regime are all critical.

Even a 20 or 30% reduction in assistance from one major country would not collapse the entire European support system. However, it could create a shortage of a specific military capability at a specific moment in the war.

Time itself is becoming one of the key parameters.

The Kremlin Does Not Need to Stop Aid to Ukraine

For Moscow, the maximum result would be the complete cessation of European support for Ukraine. But achieving a strategic effect does not require this.

It is enough to make assistance slow, unstable and politically costly.

One country reduces arms deliveries. Another blocks a sanctions package. A third opposes joint financing. A fourth calls for negotiations with Moscow.

Formally, the overall amount of assistance may remain high. In practice, the speed of decision-making declines.

For a war of attrition, this can have a significant effect.

Russian Influence Operations Are Becoming More Systematic

In March 2026, the European External Action Service published its fourth annual report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference. Its conclusion is significant: foreign information operations should be viewed not as isolated propaganda activity, but as a systemic threat against which the EU is already developing a dedicated deterrence architecture.

For Russia, information operations are part of a broader hybrid toolkit.

Doppelgänger, Storm 1516, Operation Overload, Matryoshka, Portal Kombat and related networks use cloned media outlets, fabricated materials, social platforms, automated content distribution and, increasingly, artificial intelligence tools.

Their strategic objective is much broader than supporting any particular political party.

Moscow seeks to radicalise the political environment, undermine trust in state institutions, increase conflict between political centres and expand the share of voters who associate support for Ukraine with their own economic problems.

This is why Europe’s rightward shift creates a favourable environment for Russian intelligence services, but is not necessarily their creation.

Russia is not the only cause of the migration crisis, problems in German industry or dissatisfaction with Brussels bureaucracy. It exploits existing divisions, amplifies them and directs political discontent against Ukraine, NATO and the very model of European solidarity.

The Kremlin Does Not Choose a Party. It Chooses Division.

Moscow does not necessarily need to bring AfD, National Rally or FPÖ to power.

It is enough for Berlin and Paris to assess the Russian threat differently, for governments to block sanctions, for parliaments to debate military assistance for months, for defence budgets to be set against social spending, and for support for Ukraine to become electorally toxic.

Fragmentation is itself a strategic outcome.

This is where Russia’s war against Ukraine moves from the military sphere into the sphere of Western political resilience.

Moscow is waging a war of attrition not only against the Ukrainian military. It is also working against the ability of European democracies to sustain the necessary levels of spending, sanctions and military assistance for years.

The Baltics as a Critical Test

The most dangerous consequence of political fragmentation could be the next stage of Russian pressure on NATO.

A hypothetical scenario in the Baltics would not necessarily begin with tank columns.

A cyberattack, sabotage, damage to critical infrastructure, a border provocation, a false-flag operation or an artificially created crisis involving Russian-speaking populations could allow Moscow to test the Alliance’s collective response mechanism without immediately moving to open warfare.

In such a situation, the first hours could prove decisive.

If, following a provocation against Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia, some capitals demand an immediate collective response while others call for establishing all the facts, preventing escalation and beginning negotiations with Moscow, the Kremlin would gain the political pause it needs.

The main risk of a rightward shift for NATO is not the ideology of the political right itself. The risk emerges when domestic political fragmentation begins to block the speed of collective decision-making.

Conclusion

The result of the Saxony-Anhalt election, where AfD received 43.8% compared with 17.2% for CDU, can no longer be viewed as an ordinary protest vote on the periphery of German politics. It is a signal of a changing political balance in the EU’s largest state.

But a rightward shift does not automatically mean a pro-Russian turn in Europe. Italy’s experience demonstrates this.

The key parameter is different: the ability of the European political system to make rapid collective decisions.

Russia does not need to destroy NATO. It is enough to create doubt about the Alliance’s willingness to act. It does not need to completely stop aid to Ukraine. It is enough to make it slow and unpredictable. It does not need to control Europe’s right-wing parties. It is enough to exploit political forces and social conflicts that increase European fragmentation.

Therefore, the main question for the coming years is not who will prevail in Europe, the right or the left, but whether Europe will retain the ability to finance Ukraine, rearm its own militaries and respond rapidly to Russian aggression amid growing domestic political fragmentation.

If it does, the rightward shift will remain a normal democratic transformation.

If not, the Kremlin will have an opportunity to use Europe’s democratic transformation as an instrument for exhausting Ukraine and weakening the entire Western security system.

Mykola Zentsev, international security expert, Major General (Ret.), Armed Forces of Ukraine.