June 23, 2026

The issue of Belarusian relay stations and communications hubs is no longer solely a matter of military logic. It increasingly comes down to money, fuel, and the risks facing the Lukashenko regime.

Following a series of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, Moscow has faced its most severe fuel shortage since the beginning of the full-scale war. According to industry sources, individual attacks have temporarily knocked out up to 25% of Russia’s gasoline production capacity, while petroleum product exports have fallen by approximately 15%. The Russian government has already been forced to reduce the mandatory share of gasoline sales on the exchange from 15% to 10% and encourage fuel imports.

Under these circumstances, Belarus has become a critically important fuel rear area for the Kremlin. The Mozyr Refinery and Naftan together have the capacity to process around 24 million tonnes of crude oil annually, while Belarusian gasoline supplies to russia already amount to tens of thousands of tonnes per month.

At the same time, Belarus remains part of the Union State’s joint military infrastructure. Its territory hosts communications hubs, relay stations, radar facilities, and other sites that could potentially be used to support Russian military operations.

And this is where things get interesting.

Over the past two years, Ukraine has effectively created a new class of long-range weapons. Modern Ukrainian strike drones are now routinely operating at ranges of more than 1,000 km, while some systems have demonstrated the ability to hit targets more than 2,000 km away. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recently announced the successful testing of a Ukrainian drone with a range of up to 3,000 km.

For example:

• The Liutyi UAV has been confirmed in operations at ranges exceeding 1,000 km, while some assessments put its potential range at up to 1,700 km.
• The Bober drone is estimated to have a range of 800–1,200 km, carries a warhead of up to 100 kg, and can fly at extremely low altitudes of 50–150 meters, allowing it to evade radar detection.
• The Palianytsia jet-powered drone missile has a range of approximately 650 km, a speed of up to 900 km/h, and a warhead weighing around 100 kg.

Ukraine is also increasingly relying on combined strikes. According to Western analysts, some large-scale attacks involve 200–300 long-range drones in a single night, with some operating as decoys to draw air-defense systems away and clear the way for the primary strike assets.

For Belarus, the problem lies in geography. From the Ukrainian border to most key military facilities in the Gomel, Brest, and Minsk regions, the distance ranges from several dozen to several hundred kilometers. In other words, virtually any modern Ukrainian strike drone has more than enough range to reach such targets.

This creates an uncomfortable dilemma for Lukashenko.

On one side are several dozen relay stations, communications hubs, and radar facilities that are important to Moscow. On the other are two oil refineries with a combined annual processing capacity of 24 million tonnes of crude, billions of dollars in export revenue, and Belarus’s status as the main fuel supplier to russia.

Conclusion

The main question is not whether Ukraine can reach Belarusian relay stations. Judging by strikes conducted at ranges of 1,000, 2,000, and even more than 3,000 km, the technical capability to do so has existed for some time.

The real question is different: what matters more to Lukashenko — supporting Russian military infrastructure or preserving the operation of two strategic oil refineries that are currently helping sustain russia’s fuel resilience?

The more dependent the Kremlin becomes on Belarusian gasoline and diesel, the more costly any escalation around Belarus will become for Moscow.

That is why shutting down the relay stations could prove to be a far cheaper option than risking the loss of Belarus’s status as the primary fuel base for Russia’s war machine.

How Ukraine could force Belarus to switch off its relay stations.