Iran and russia are once again moving toward signing an agreement on the construction of the Rasht-Astara railway through Azerbaijan, a key section of the International North-South Transport Corridor. According to IRNA, representatives of Tehran and Moscow are expected to sign the document shortly.
In reality, this agreement has already been announced several times as “final.” The basic understanding between Raisi and Putin dates back to 2023, while in February 2026 the two sides signed another set of technical and financial documents concerning land allocation and contractors. Russia and Iran link the official launch of the project’s practical implementation to April 1, when the final terms were expected to be formalized at a transport forum in Moscow.
It is significant that the Kremlin is now stepping up promotion of the project, demonstrating its geopolitical potential and its ability to retain allies despite sanctions pressure. Last month, Putin held a telephone conversation with Aliyev, while on August 23–24 Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar traveled to Moscow for a meeting of the intergovernmental commission. This is laying the groundwork for an expected visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which the Kremlin has discussed for 2026, although no specific date has yet been announced.
Who Actually Needs It?
The West is not a participant here, but rather the reason for the project. The corridor is being developed under sanctions pressure so that Moscow and Tehran can trade with each other and with India while bypassing Western financial and maritime infrastructure.
China is indirectly interested. Beijing is not formally a party to the agreement and has traditionally invested more heavily in the eastern route of the corridor through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. However, the western branch through Azerbaijan fits into the broader logic of bypassing routes controlled by the West.
Azerbaijan is not a signatory, but without its territory and tariff regime, already regulated by a trilateral memorandum with russia and Iran, the corridor cannot physically operate. Baku gains transit revenue while strengthening its position as a key regional transport hub.
India formally distances itself from the project in public, but it is the corridor’s ultimate destination: access through the Caspian Sea and Iran to the Persian Gulf ports, followed by maritime transportation.
The key point for understanding the broader context is that this is not an ordinary infrastructure story. It is an element in the formation of logistical autonomy for the Moscow-Tehran axis, which the Kremlin is also using to demonstrate its foreign-policy agency ahead of the upcoming domestic political season.