May 5, 2026

An opinion column by Major General (Ret.) Mykola Zentsev for Ukrinform.

What factors should be considered decisive when assessing and forecasting developments in this direction?

Over the past two weeks, the information space has been filled with discussions about military activity on the part of Belarus, and even President Zelenskyy has drawn attention to these risks.

The construction of new border posts, training grounds, and a base for airborne troops, as well as the installation of relay stations for UAV control along the border, creates a sense of déjà vu from 2022 — something that will remain a source of painful memories for Ukrainians for many years to come.

Each new element of Belarusian military infrastructure may look like “normal development” on its own, but together they form an alarming picture on the regional chessboard. In 2026, five new border-post complexes are planned along the border with Ukraine. The same number were built in 2025.

Among the planned border posts is Svecha in the Narovlya district of Gomel region, located just 860 meters from Ukraine. In the same region, 40 km from the border, a military settlement is being built on the grounds of the Chaika recreation camp in the village of Yakimivka. It is a training center for airborne troops capable of accommodating an airborne brigade.

Five UAV relay stations are being installed along the border. They can use all three technological communication channels: GSM, satellite communications, and MESH technology. This infrastructure is not critical for defense, but it is important for conducting strikes against Ukraine using drones.

We saw these systems being tested on May 1 and 2. The appearance of individual Shahed drones over Kyiv region and the loitering of helicopters along the Belarusian side of the border are related events. They represent testing of new MESH communication modules for drone control and assessment of signal quality over distance.

The towers along the Belarusian border are likely equipped with 20-watt MESH transmitters. We have seen similar applications of this type of communications and Shahed control during the attempted assassination of Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister S. Beskrestnov. Unusual activity by two helicopters was also detected along the border, most likely involving MESH transmitters.

A frequency range of 1,300–1,500 MHz, combined with MESH communications technology, allows Shahed drones and other UAVs — such as Gerbera or Molniya — to maintain stable control at distances of up to 220 km when the relay is positioned at an altitude of 2,000 meters.

Belarus is an ideal location for deploying such technologies on both stationary and airborne platforms when conducting Russian drone strikes against Ukraine.

Recently, balloons have also begun to be used for similar missions from Belarusian territory.

Another issue worth mentioning is engineering infrastructure in the form of dams and embankments, including the “Eastern Bypass” in the areas of Yakubivka and Chenkiv. These facilities are formally civilian, but they allow heavy equipment to move through terrain where this was previously difficult.

In military terminology, this is known as operational preparation of terrain and the creation of lateral roads for the rapid redeployment of troops during an offensive operation.

Another indication of possible aggressive action and preparations for war is Lukashenko’s decision to call up reserve officers under the age of 27 who have not completed mandatory military service. This is not a classic mobilization, but it represents preparation of a personnel reserve for the coming year.

Taken together, these indicators raise the question: where is the main threat actually directed? An offensive against Ukraine or preparations for an attack on the Baltic states?

There is no doubt that Belarus currently has not accumulated sufficient forces and capabilities to launch an offensive against Ukraine. The time required to deploy troops is too long, and there are no signs of preparations for the immediate transfer of forces to the border.

An analysis of the operational and strategic options for employing the armed forces of Belarus and the Russian force contingent confidently confirms this conclusion. An offensive from the north should not be expected in the coming months.

There are four factors, three of which would have to occur simultaneously for a strike by a Russian-Belarusian force against Ukraine to become a reality.

Factor 1: Russia abandons plans for an attack on the Baltic states

This would redirect resources southward toward Kyiv.

Probability: low.

Factor 2: A deep domestic political crisis in Ukraine

Such a crisis could tear the country apart from within and sharply weaken its defenses. Turbulence could be triggered by elections and a struggle for power, a war of compromising information, and speculation surrounding anti-corruption investigations.

Probability: high.

Factor 3: A strategic breakthrough by Russian forces toward the Dnipro

A major Russian breakthrough on the battlefield toward the Dnipro would fundamentally alter the strategic situation.

Probability: low.

Factor 4: A critical reduction in financial assistance to Ukraine

A sharp decline in financial support from European partners and the United States could have a devastating impact on Ukraine’s economy and social sector — contributing to Factor 2 — while also reducing the level of military support available to Ukraine to contain the front — contributing to Factor 3.

Probability: low.

The main architect of scenarios involving operations from Belarusian territory remains the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. At present, its main planning resources, apart from the war against Ukraine, are focused on the northwestern direction.

Gotland, Narva, Suwałki — these locations are appearing increasingly often in the strategic calculations of Minsk and Moscow.

Most forecasts by military analysts point to a window of opportunity for Russia to launch an offensive against the Baltic states from Belarusian territory in August–September 2027. At the same time, provocative actions involving the Belarusian armed forces could begin as early as spring 2027.

Of course, any forecast is a subjective assessment based on available factual information. Nevertheless, these forecasts once again confirm the information presented at the beginning of this analysis.

The potential threat of an invasion of Ukraine from Belarus remains, but only under certain circumstances — and not this year.

Source: Ukrinform