The passage of the U.S. Congress and signing on September 18, 2026, of the “Lindsey Graham Sanctions Against Russia and Iran Act” (H.R. 5334) in Washington was presented as an important result of the U.S. “peace through strength” policy. At the same time, the mechanism incorporated into the final version of the legislation differs substantially from the original concept. The powerful economic leverage intended to place maximum pressure on buyers of russian energy resources ultimately gained significant room for political maneuvering.

The original concept was designed to deprive the kremlin of financial resources for continuing its aggression by creating global economic risks for countries purchasing russian energy. However, prolonged procedural delays, changes to the provisions, and expanded exemptions gradually altered the nature of the mechanism. What began as a tough economic ultimatum has become an instrument whose application largely depends on a decision by the White House.

1. From 500% to 100%: How the Tariff Mechanism Changed

The initial initiative, developed by Republican senators with the involvement of Lindsey Graham in spring 2025, called for 500% tariffs on imports from countries that continued purchasing russian energy resources. The logic was straightforward: major economies, including China, India, and Turkey, would be incentivized to abandon russian oil and gas by the threat of losing access to the U.S. market.

In August 2025, the proposal received support from more than 85 of the 100 senators. However, its key provisions were subsequently changed during the legislative process.

• The maximum secondary tariff rate was reduced. Instead of the initial 500% for countries purchasing russian energy, the final document allows tariffs of up to 100%.
• The 500% rate was retained only for direct U.S. imports from russia, which are already minimal because of existing embargoes. At the same time, secondary tariffs were limited to the five largest buyers of russian oil and gas.
• Automatic implementation of sanctions was removed. The original concept envisaged mandatory action after a specified deadline. The final version leaves the decision to the U.S. president.
• The scope for exemptions was expanded. While the initial proposal provided only limited authority for delays, the final document gives the White House broad powers to waive tariffs on “national security” grounds.

2. Deadlines Without Sanctions: The Problem of Unfulfilled Threats

Economic pressure works when the threat of punishment is perceived as inevitable. In July 2025, the White House gave the kremlin 50 days to agree to a ceasefire, linking the deadline to the threat of secondary tariffs. The deadline was later shortened, signaling an increased sense of urgency.

However, no specific executive sanctions measures followed the expiration of the announced deadlines. This created a situation in which moscow could interpret public ultimatums as political signals without an inevitable economic consequence.

The absence of concrete action after the deadlines weakened the deterrent effect of the sanctions mechanism and raised questions about the credibility of U.S. threats to impose economic pressure.

3. A Year of Delays: Time Gained by the kremlin

According to sector observers and Reuters, the bill spent more than a year moving through Capitol Hill. The White House gave its official approval for advancing the legislation only in July 2026.

During this period, russia gained additional time to adapt to potentially stronger sanctions pressure.

• Logistics were reorganized. The russian energy sector expanded and consolidated its “shadow fleet” and oil transshipment schemes at sea.
• Financial resources were accumulated. High global oil prices gave moscow an opportunity to build additional liquidity to finance prolonged military operations and large-scale missile strikes.

4. National Security as a Mechanism for Political Maneuvering

The key feature of the Lindsey Graham Act is not only the size of the tariffs but also the mechanism for applying them. The law does not impose tariffs automatically. It gives the U.S. president the authority to decide whether to impose them and allows restrictions to be delayed or lifted on the grounds of “national security” interests.

As a result, a mechanism originally intended to function as an automatic economic barrier for buyers of russian energy has gained significant room for political maneuvering.

The instrument designed to restrict the aggressor’s financial flows ultimately became dependent on a decision by the U.S. president. The White House will determine when, against whom, and to what extent tariff restrictions may be activated.

During his address to the UN General Assembly on September 22, 2026, the U.S. president again spoke about having “levers of pressure” and the intention to achieve results quickly. At the same time, without clarification on unconditional implementation of the tariff mechanism against buyers of russian oil, questions remain about how this leverage will be used in practice.

What Changed as a Result

The initial Lindsey Graham concept was based on a clear economic logic: make continued aggression more costly for russia by restricting access for its energy exports to global markets.

The final version of the legislative initiative substantially changed this approach:

• time for the rapid application of economic pressure was lost;
• maximum rates and the rigidity of the tariff mechanism were reduced;
• automatic sanctions were replaced with presidential discretion;
• opportunities to delay or cancel restrictions were expanded.

As a result, the sanctions mechanism retains the potential to exert significant economic pressure, but its practical impact depends on a political decision by the White House. For the kremlin, the key issue is not the mere existence of sanctions provisions but their actual implementation, which would need to create direct financial losses and reduce export revenues.