October–November 2026
1. NUCLEAR POWER: THROUGH THE ELECTRICITY GRID
The priority threat scenario involves strikes against switchyards, substations and transmission lines through which nuclear power plants deliver electricity to consumers. The objective is to restrict power output, force generating units to reduce their load or shut down, create electricity shortages and cause large-scale outages.
Such an outcome is possible without direct strikes on reactors. At the same time, damage to grid connections creates additional nuclear safety risks. The protection of substations near nuclear power plants has been identified by the International Energy Agency (IEA) as one of the key measures for energy resilience.
According to a report on material published by The New York Times on October 2, the plan described in an intercepted document envisages up to 1,000 missiles, drones and air-dropped bombs targeting energy and life-support infrastructure. The listed targets include electricity import nodes, hydroelectric power plants and the infrastructure connecting three operating nuclear power plants to the grid. The publication did not confirm the authenticity of the document. The figure of 1,000 describes the campaign outlined in the document and does not represent a confirmed simultaneous salvo.
2. THERMAL POWER GENERATION AND ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION
Continued strikes against thermal power plants, combined heat and power plants, substations and grid nodes are likely, including repeated attacks on repaired facilities. The risk will increase as demand for heating rises.
Analytical assessment: the simultaneous loss of dispatchable generation and the ability to transmit nuclear-generated electricity will make it more difficult to balance the power system. Possible consequences include emergency outages and localized blackouts. A nationwide blackout is a risk scenario, not an inevitable outcome. The logic of cascading failures and depletion of repair resources is examined in an analysis by Konrad Muzyka published in Ukraine-Analysen.
3. WATER SUPPLY AND WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT
Over the two-month horizon, two scenarios need to be considered: direct damage to water infrastructure and disruption of its operation due to power outages.
Power disruptions have already caused interruptions in water supply. The Kyiv City State Administration, in particular, reported the restoration of power to water-supply facilities and pressure in the networks following the October 10, 2025 attack. This confirms the dependence of water supply on the power system, although it does not in itself prove a direct strike on pumping stations.
Possible consequences of new attacks include reduced water pressure, lack of water on upper floors, disruptions to wastewater management, and additional pressure on hospitals and population-support facilities. The United Nations documented interconnected disruptions to electricity, heating and water supply during the winter of 2025–2026.
4. TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
The risk of repeated strikes against bridges, data centers and transport-support facilities will remain. Even a temporary closure of crossings can disrupt the movement of personnel, repair crews and cargo.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and Critical Threats Project link strikes against the Southern Bridge to a campaign targeting Kyiv’s economy and everyday functioning.
IAC “ANDROMEDA” ASSESSMENT
For October–November, preparations should account for a combination of regular drone pressure and individual large-scale missile-and-drone attacks.
The main threat lies in the simultaneous disruption of electricity transmission from nuclear power plants, thermal power generation, water supply and transport connections.