Today, Putin signed a decree increasing the authorized strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 2,426,130 personnel, including 1,535,000 military personnel. Formally, the increase is explained by the creation of military construction units, for which 25,000 new positions have been allocated. This is already the sixth increase in the size of the Russian army since the beginning of the full-scale war and the second within the past month and a half.

The decree itself is an administrative personnel document. But the timing of its publication is hardly accidental.

At the same time, Ukraine is systematically striking Russian oil refineries. According to industry sources, gasoline production during the summer has been 35–45% below demand, oil refining has fallen to its lowest level in 16 years, while many regions have experienced queues at gas stations, sales by ration coupons and QR codes, fuel limits, and sharp price increases. Putin himself publicly acknowledged the existence of queues for the first time, calling the situation “non-critical.”

Another blow to the Kremlin came from Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s public call to “freeze” the war and return to negotiations. Peskov was forced to state that Russia’s position remained unchanged.

Against this background, the decree increasing the army looks less like a response to an immediate military necessity and more like a demonstration of strength. Instead of news about fuel shortages and growing diplomatic pressure, the Kremlin is offering a different information agenda: the state is expanding its armed forces and demonstrating its readiness to continue the war.

This is consistent with assessments by experts from the Andromeda Information and Analytical Center. Analysts note that following his meeting with Tokayev, Putin gave no signals of readiness for compromise and, on the contrary, continued to justify the continuation of hostilities.

At the same time, preparations for a possible expansion of mobilization measures are underway. The State Duma is reviewing eligibility criteria for military service, while the Russian National Guard is preparing amendments to the regulatory framework in case of mobilization and the introduction of martial law.

Formally, the decree concerns the authorized personnel strength of the Ministry of Defense. In reality, it is an information gesture designed to overshadow issues that are increasingly uncomfortable for the Kremlin: strikes on oil refineries, the fuel crisis, and growing fatigue even among Russia’s partners.

The expansion of the army is therefore becoming not only a military measure, but also a propaganda signal intended to demonstrate the supposed “unyielding” nature of the regime.

Militarism as a cover: the Kremlin is using the expansion of the Russian army to project strength while attempting to conceal growing economic, logistical, and diplomatic pressure.