April 23, 2026
Over the past decade and a half, Orbán has deeply embedded a system of Chinese presence in Hungary. Hungary is at risk of finding itself not at the center of European industry, but on the periphery of China’s.
Péter Magyar came to power promising to return Hungary to the European political mainstream. However, his actual starting position is not a blank slate, but a deeply embedded system of Chinese presence built by Viktor Orbán over the past fifteen years.
The “Opening to the East” policy has evolved into something far more significant than diplomacy: production clusters, infrastructure projects, and financial commitments that have given China a special place in Hungary’s foreign policy. In other words, it is a form of dependency that cannot simply be abolished by decree.
Hungary has become a key foothold for China’s battery and electric vehicle expansion in Europe. In Debrecen, massive facilities operated by or being built for CATL and EVE Energy are already underway, alongside a full-cycle BYD manufacturing plant.
The risk for Magyar of dismantling this Chinese web is obvious: an immediate blow to employment and serious challenges related to Hungary’s financial obligations to Beijing.
If nothing is done and the current situation is simply left in place, Hungary risks becoming locked into technological dependence. In that case, the country could find itself not at the center of European industry, but on the periphery of China’s.
For years, Orbán’s government acted within the EU as the main blocker of decisions affecting Chinese interests — from statements concerning Taiwan to trade restrictions.
This has created a paradox: the United States considers China a potential threat, while viewing Orbán as a friend. At the same time, Orbán has been opening the doors to China in Europe.
China’s infrastructure “anchors” may prevent Hungary from breaking free. The most prominent symbol of Chinese presence is the Belgrade–Budapest railway, the most important component of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative in Europe.
The problem is not only its political significance, but also the structure of the contracts, which include limited transparency, financing tied to Chinese banks, and penalties for revising the terms. This creates a classic infrastructure trap: the project is difficult to complete on favorable terms, but even more difficult to walk away from.
Chinese presence is not limited to factories and railways. It also involves loans with conditions tied to Chinese contractors, special regulatory regimes for investors, and limited public disclosure of agreements.
In the long term, such an arrangement undermines a state’s ability to act independently, because every decision must be weighed against the risk of financial or investment losses.
For Péter Magyar, this will also be a difficult choice — between Brussels and the European community on one side, and Beijing and the obligations inherited from Orbán on the other.
We hope that at a time when World War III is no longer merely a scare story but a present reality, he will make his choice in favor of the EU.
Mykola Zentsev, international security expert, owner of a humanitarian demining company, Major General (Ret.)
Source: Ukrinform