Vadym Bolotnik, PhD, Vice President of the Andromeda Information and Analytical Center
France is simultaneously preparing to counter the Russian threat and seeking the lifting of sanctions against a Russian billionaire. On September 18, Macron ordered stronger protection of critical infrastructure against drones and cyberattacks, citing the growing Russian hybrid threat. Four days later, Paris secured political support for removing Alisher Usmanov from the EU sanctions list. This contradiction requires explanation.
Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine and is expanding pressure on European states. NATO explicitly identifies sabotage, cyberattacks, interference and provocations as elements of Russia’s hybrid campaign. Airspace violations test the readiness of allies to respond collectively. A direct confrontation between the russian federation and NATO remains a risk for which preparations are necessary, although its inevitability has not been established. In this situation, support for Ukraine, defense production and sanctions should serve a common goal: limiting moscow’s ability to wage and expand the war.
It is in this context that the French maneuver should be assessed.
On September 22, the EU removed Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from its sanctions list. Paris promoted Usmanov’s case, joining Slovakia’s position and citing national security. Luxembourg pushed for a decision concerning Fridman amid his approximately $16 billion lawsuit. Different national interests converged in a single compromise.
The list also saw the removal of Andrei Falaleyev, the former rector of the Crimean Federal University. At the same time, the relevant personal restrictions against around 3,000 other individuals and entities were extended for another three years, until September 22, 2029. This is a significant result: there will be fewer opportunities to regularly block the renewal of this sanctions regime. But the price of the compromise was the introduction of personal exemptions.
The French negotiating line ran through Baku. Businessman Martin Ryan was arrested in December 2023 and sentenced to ten years in prison in March 2026 for espionage. France rejected the grounds for his prosecution. Another French citizen, Anass Derraz, an employee of water management company Saur, received a twelve-year sentence on corruption charges. According to European diplomats, Baku used the Usmanov case to pressure Paris over the imprisoned French citizens. Azerbaijan denied this.
On September 23, Ilham Aliyev pardoned Ryan, who subsequently traveled to Paris. Derraz was not included in the announced list of pardoned prisoners. The following day, the French Foreign Ministry called Ryan’s release a step toward normalizing relations with Baku. The official statement did not link the release to the Usmanov case, but European media sources reported such a connection.
Paris may have been pursuing several objectives simultaneously: bringing its citizen home, restoring dialogue with Azerbaijan and expanding its own capabilities in the South Caucasus. Against the backdrop of energy instability, relations with Baku may have additional strategic value.
On the morning of September 22, approximately 14% of French petrol stations lacked at least one type of fuel. Reports concerning Macron’s letter to the European Commission referred to the risk of global oil supplies being reduced by another approximately four million barrels per day if the Strait of Hormuz remained effectively closed and the Saudi East-West oil pipeline did not resume operations.
Azerbaijan is important as a supplier and transit state, but its capabilities are not unlimited. In 2025, it exported 12.8 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe, slightly less than the previous year. The energy situation may have increased Paris’s interest in normalizing relations, but there are no confirmed guarantees of energy supplies in exchange for the sanctions decision.
At the same time, reducing the entire arrangement to the route “Paris — Baku — Kremlin” would be an oversimplification. According to Euronews, Usmanov’s removal was also supported by Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with the latter playing a mediating role. France may have seen an opportunity to work with this network of independent interests while using its own weight within the EU. However, this does not yet prove the emergence of a French lever of influence over Kremlin decision-making.
At the same time, moscow applied economic pressure. Under a decree dated September 17, the Russian assets of Auchan, Nestlé, the former Leroy Merlin structures, and logistics companies FM Logistic and Bati Logistics were transferred to the temporary management of “L.E.V. Management.” Dmitry Peskov cited the owners’ links to “unfriendly” states among the factors behind the decision. According to Important Stories, the management company was headed by a former deputy head of the Interior Ministry’s migration department.
Pressure on Paris may have been among the objectives of this decision. However, Nestlé is a Swiss company, and a direct connection between the seizure of control over these assets and negotiations concerning Usmanov has not been established. It would be premature to claim that French diplomacy has already defeated Russian economic coercion. What is clear is that the negotiations took place against the backdrop of the Kremlin’s continued use of Western businesses as an instrument of pressure.
A personnel episode added another layer of intrigue. On September 24, putin dismissed Alexey Meshkov as ambassador to France and Monaco, positions he had held since 2017. This coincidence may also reflect dissatisfaction with the work of the diplomatic mission. However, on July 22, Vedomosti reported that Meshkov might move to the Federation Council representing the Tver Region. Therefore, linking his dismissal specifically to the arrangements surrounding Usmanov can only be regarded as an unconfirmed assumption.
There is also a more important element for European security. The Latvian government, explaining the sanctions compromise, reported Macron’s agreement to begin negotiations on Latvia’s participation in the French nuclear deterrence initiative. This is still the beginning of negotiations, not an already established nuclear guarantee. But it shows that resolving the dispute was accompanied by discussions about the defense of NATO’s eastern flank.
Thus, the assumption of a broader French calculation has grounds. Paris may have sought to combine closer relations with Baku, the longer-term preservation of sanctions and a stronger French role in European deterrence against Russia. Such a maneuver does not automatically mean a shift toward reconciliation with the aggressor.
However, its vulnerability is obvious. Personal sanctions were weakened through arrangements that are not publicly linked to ending Russian aggression. Andrii Sybiha called the decision shameful and unjustified. Latvia announced preparations for national restrictions, while Estonia’s Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna signed a decision on September 23 imposing national sanctions on Usmanov and Fridman.
This precedent may encourage further attempts to pressure individual capitals in order to alter common EU decisions. Baku demonstrated the effectiveness of its influence. Russian beneficiaries received a concrete easing of restrictions. France’s strategic gains still largely require implementation.
The three-year extension of the sanctions regime reduces the frequency of battles over its renewal. At the same time, exemptions create a risk that a collective deterrence instrument will increasingly be used for bargaining over national interests.
For Ukraine and Europe, the measure of this maneuver is straightforward: will it become harder for Russia to continue its aggression, and easier for Europe to defend itself? If the French arrangements lead to a real strengthening of Baltic defense and a more resilient sanctions regime, Paris will have arguments supporting its calculation. If the defense results remain promises, the price of the tactical success will be a weakening of the common position.
Paris has the right to pursue complex diplomacy. But the strategic quality of that diplomacy is ultimately determined by whether it strengthens European security. The sanctions have already been lifted for the individuals concerned. France must now demonstrate the effectiveness of the rest of its maneuver.