North Korea has become an external resource base for Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Pyongyang systematically compensates for shortages of missiles, artillery ammunition, and manpower, allowing the Kremlin to maintain a high intensity of combat operations despite the depletion of its own resources.

Missile Shortages and North Korean Support

russia is facing a shortage of its own missiles, despite intensive production of approximately 60 Iskander ballistic missiles per month. As of early August, the Russian grouping reportedly had around 130 9M723 ballistic missiles for Iskander-M systems. For a war of this scale, this is insufficient. As a result, supplies from North Korea have become not merely an additional source of weaponry, but a buffer against the depletion of Russia’s own ballistic missile stockpile.

Since late 2023, Pyongyang has reportedly supplied Russia with approximately 150 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles. In August 2026, Ukraine detected the deployment of a North Korean missile unit in Russia’s Voronezh region, consisting of approximately 90 personnel and six launchers, with the capacity to deploy up to 120 missiles. As of July, around 50 North Korean KN-23, KN-24 and KN-30 ballistic missiles reportedly remained in russia, meaning that this resource has already been integrated directly into Russia’s strike cycle.

Most North Korean missiles are deployed in the Voronezh region, from where their range covers Ukraine’s Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. Ballistic missiles are among the most difficult targets to intercept, while Ukraine has a limited number of systems capable of countering them.

A separate level of threat is posed by the emergence of the new KN-30 missile. Its key difference from the KN-23 and KN-24 is an exceptionally heavy warhead of up to 2.5 tonnes. While the KN-23 and KN-24 provide the ability to conduct mass strikes, the KN-30 can cause extensive destruction to industrial, energy and fortified military targets, expanding Russia’s range of strike capabilities.

The Artillery Wave and Combat Systems

North Korea’s artillery contribution is no less critical. According to Western estimates, Pyongyang has supplied the aggressor with millions of artillery shells. At one stage, deliveries reportedly reached 20,000 containers, equivalent to approximately 9.4 million 152 mm shells.

According to Ukrainian estimates, this covers up to 25–30% of the Russian army’s ammunition requirements. Moscow is therefore able to maintain a high rate of fire on the hottest sections of the front.

Along with ammunition, Russia has received M-1989 Koksan 170 mm self-propelled artillery systems, 240 mm rocket systems and other artillery assets that are already being actively used on the battlefield.

From Infantry to UAV Operators

The North Korean personnel contribution is also evolving from infantry deployments toward UAV operators.

In 2024–2025, Pyongyang sent tens of thousands of military personnel to russia, primarily special forces used as infantry. In August 2026, a new group of approximately 8,500 personnel arrived, including around 400 UAV operators and more than 1,000 engineers and sappers. Most of this contingent is being deployed in Russia’s Kursk region.

For the Kremlin, this provides a way to assign auxiliary, engineering, security and unmanned-system tasks to North Korean personnel, freeing Russian units for offensive operations elsewhere.

For Pyongyang, this is a large-scale combat training program. North Korean personnel are gaining practical experience in the use of FPV drones, reconnaissance UAVs and loitering munitions such as the Lancet.

North Korean manpower is also being used in production. At Alabuga in Tatarstan, the main assembly center for Shahed-type strike UAVs, known in Russia as Geran, up to 12,000 North Korean workers are reportedly employed.

Pyongyang is rapidly building its own modern school of unmanned warfare, extending from drone production lines to operators on the battlefield.

Regional Dimension and Strategic Consequences for the Indo-Pacific

The regional and strategic consequences of this cooperation for the Indo-Pacific are significant.

Russian-North Korean military cooperation creates direct security risks for the Indo-Pacific region. Moscow receives missiles, artillery shells, soldiers and workers, while Pyongyang gains access to satellite and space technologies, air-defense systems, unmanned and naval technologies, as well as real-world data on overcoming modern air-defense and electronic-warfare systems.

Against this backdrop, Seoul has a logical reason to assess whether its policy restricting the transfer of defense capabilities to Ukraine should be reconsidered.

South Korea’s defense industry, including Hanwha Aerospace, has the capacity to strengthen Ukraine with artillery, integrated air-defense systems and electronic-warfare capabilities.

Such a step would go beyond simply supporting Ukraine. It would also give Seoul an opportunity to study the real-world tactics and application of North Korean weapons under combat conditions.

Japan’s easing of restrictions on defense-technology exports in 2026 opens an opportunity for practical exchanges of experience with Kyiv. Ukraine’s experience in countering ballistic threats, mass drone attacks and electronic warfare represents precisely the type of challenges that could become relevant to Tokyo and Seoul in their own region.

Military cooperation with Ukraine is therefore becoming a factor in strengthening their own national security.

Disrupting North Korea’s Resource Contribution

Effectively neutralizing North Korean resources in order to save the lives of Ukrainian civilians requires more than intercepting missiles in Ukrainian airspace or repelling attacks along the front. It requires systematic disruption of the supply chains themselves.

The main supply route runs through the Trans-Siberian Railway and border stations in eastern russia, including Khasan and Raffein.

Striking launchers and field ammunition depots in the Kursk and Belgorod regions using precision systems such as HIMARS, ATACMS and long-range UAVs could neutralize missiles before they are distributed directly to combat units.

The collection of precise data on the equipment involved and transportation routes also creates opportunities to strengthen sanctions and enable the international community to monitor and intercept North Korean vessels in international waters.

The course of events demonstrates that the deepening cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang requires the Ukrainian Defense Forces to act proactively, while regional partners must take practical measures to protect their own security.

This is no longer simply a matter of resource deliveries. It represents the final transformation of the war into a coalition conflict in which the Kremlin has brought another nuclear-armed state into direct military involvement, creating corresponding risks for global security.

Mykola Zentsev, international security expert, Major General (Ret.).