None of the 16 satellites of Russia’s “Rassvet” constellation, launched on July 19, had reached operational orbit as of August 31. Most of the spacecraft remain at an altitude of 300–400 km, while some are already losing altitude. At least two satellites are on a trajectory toward atmospheric re-entry.

Russia accelerated development of the system after losing access to Starlink for its military forces. However, Moscow is now facing three major problems simultaneously: the low quality and reliability of its satellites, a shortage of launch vehicles, and the vulnerability of manufacturing and launch infrastructure to Ukrainian strikes. Various estimates suggest that at least 200–300 operational satellites would be required to provide continuous coverage over Ukraine. At the current launch rate and failure rate, that goal appears unattainable in the near term.

This raises an obvious question: could China fill the gap?

At first glance, Beijing has the necessary capabilities. The state-owned China SatNet is developing the military-oriented Guowang megaconstellation, with plans for up to 13,000 satellites. According to Chinese sources, some of these spacecraft are expected to feature laser communication terminals, radars, and optical sensors. At the same time, the private company Qianfan is developing a commercial constellation of 15,000 satellites, with 238 already in orbit.

But scale does not mean readiness to share.

Both networks are being developed primarily to serve China’s own strategic objectives: securing orbital slots and frequencies ahead of Western competitors and creating a communications channel independent of Starlink for the Chinese military and its partners in the Belt and Road Initiative. Qianfan has already experienced deployment problems caused by engine and gyroscope failures on some spacecraft and only resumed its previous launch pace this spring. There is no obvious “surplus” capacity available for Russia.

Directly transferring satellite capacity to Russia, particularly integrating Chinese terminals into Russian combat systems, would amount to overt military cooperation. That could expose Beijing to the risk of secondary sanctions.

What is actually taking place between Beijing and Moscow in the space and related technology sectors appears to be more limited. Investigations by The Insider and other sources have pointed to joint work on systems designed to intercept Starlink satellites, the exchange of data on the combat use of drones and loitering munitions in return for Chinese developments in artificial intelligence and air defense, as well as the supply of microchips and other electronic components. This represents technological and component-level support rather than a ready-made replacement for Russia’s orbital constellation.

At the same time, the possibility of further Chinese assistance may already be under discussion. Putin and Xi Jinping are currently meeting in Bishkek. The Kremlin officially stated that the two sides discussed “the entire scope of trade, economic and bilateral cooperation that cannot be discussed publicly for understandable reasons.” Experts and intelligence assessments have repeatedly linked this confidential cooperation to advanced technologies, including satellite reconnaissance, as well as the use of Chinese technologies and components in the modernization of Russian UAVs.

It therefore cannot be ruled out that satellite communications and the future of the “Rassvet” system are also among the issues being discussed behind closed doors.

For Moscow, the problem is not simply the failure of individual satellites. “Rassvet” exposes a broader weakness in Russia’s ability to independently build and sustain a modern low-Earth-orbit communications network at the scale required for military operations.

China may be able to provide Russia with technologies, components and expertise. But replacing an entire satellite constellation is a fundamentally different task. Beijing has its own strategic priorities, its own vulnerabilities and little incentive to turn its emerging space infrastructure into a direct extension of Russia’s military communications network.

The question, therefore, is not whether China can technically help Russia. It is how far Beijing is prepared to go without turning technological cooperation into an overt military alliance and exposing itself to the political and economic consequences.