The summer of 2026 has revealed an uncomfortable combination of signals for the Kremlin: record cash withdrawals from Russian banks, public efforts to downplay the consequences of Ukrainian strikes on infrastructure, and growing rumors of a new mobilization wave immediately after the State Duma elections.

Each of these developments can be explained away individually. Together, however, they form a picture of a system attempting to make it through the electoral cycle without allowing society to see the full scale of the pressure building beneath the surface.

Money Is Leaving the Banks

According to the Central Bank of russia, cash withdrawals accelerated from month to month during the summer. In June, Russians withdrew more than $4.5 billion, in July the figure reached $7.3 billion, and during the first two weeks of August another nearly $3.4 billion was withdrawn.

The total for the summer reached a record $15.2 billion. The Washington Post linked this trend to fears among the population that bank deposits could be frozen or confiscated by the state to finance the war.

This is not the behavior of people who trust official rhetoric about stability. It is the behavior of people preparing for the worst-case scenario.

The Rhetoric of Downplaying the Crisis

Against this background, putin, speaking at a meeting of the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects, described the consequences of Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure as “non-critical.”

At the same time, he acknowledged that damage had occurred and said that the state would have to compensate logistics and warehouse facilities for their losses. In effect, he confirmed the scale of the problem while simultaneously attempting to minimize its political significance.

This is a classic model of authoritarian information management: acknowledge the fact, but prevent it from becoming a source of public anxiety before the electoral cycle is complete.

Rumors of Mobilization After the Elections

The third element is the growing wave of rumors about a possible new mobilization campaign immediately after the State Duma elections in autumn 2026.

Officially, no such plans have been confirmed. Government representatives, including the chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee, insist that a mobilization decision can be made only by the country’s highest leadership depending on the situation at the front. Current military manpower requirements are supposedly being covered by contract soldiers, with putin claiming that 50,000–60,000 people are being recruited each month.

However, indirect indicators are accumulating:

• legislation expanding the list of Criminal Code provisions under which convicted prisoners can sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense;
• the mass appearance on Avito of bait advertisements for “warehouse security jobs” at Wildberries and Ozon, which, according to the Russian outlet Verstka, are actually being used to recruit people for the war;
• the creation of an electronic summons registry and a unified database of persons liable for military service;
• a record level of internet searches about mobilization and military deferments since autumn 2022;
• a surge in requests for assistance to human-rights projects such as “Idite Lesom,” reaching 150–200 inquiries per day.

The result has even been queues at the Georgian border, as people attempt to leave Russia as a precaution rather than waiting for an official announcement.

The Logic of “Stabilization for the Elections”

These three developments form a coherent hypothesis: the Kremlin is deliberately limiting public acknowledgment of economic and military pressure in order to get through the electoral cycle without social unrest. Only after the elections could it allow itself unpopular measures, including a new wave of mobilization.

There is a historical precedent for this logic. In 2022, mobilization was announced only after the so-called referendums had been held in the occupied Ukrainian territories, meaning that the Kremlin waited until a politically important stage had been completed.

The timing of the State Duma elections in autumn 2026 fits the same behavioral pattern.

The silence, therefore, may not indicate the absence of preparations. It may indicate preparation itself.

Silence before mobilization: the Kremlin is managing public anxiety until the elections are over.