Ankara proposes reducing risks to international shipping and creating conditions for further negotiations

Promoting an initiative to introduce a partial moratorium on strikes in the Black Sea and against energy infrastructure was one of the most important objectives of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan during his visit to Kyiv. Ankara proposes reducing risks to international shipping and creating conditions for further negotiations, beginning with two of the most sensitive areas: Black Sea security and energy infrastructure.

The safety of civilian shipping undoubtedly serves the interests of all Black Sea states. However, any agreements must first and foremost be assessed in terms of their impact on the military-strategic balance. This is where the main question arises: could a moratorium become an instrument for restoring russia’s capabilities at sea?

In recent years, Ukraine has conducted one of the most successful naval campaigns of the modern war. Through the integrated use of maritime unmanned systems, precision weapons, and advanced intelligence, the russian Black Sea Fleet has effectively been deprived of freedom of action in the northwestern part of the Black Sea. russia was forced to redeploy a significant portion of its naval assets from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk, while Ukraine restored its maritime exports even after the termination of the “grain deal.”

However, the most important change has been the shift in the focus of combat operations from warships to russia’s maritime logistics.

According to the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Command, during the first phase of the “Molochka” operation, 117 vessels were hit in the Sea of Azov. After the operation expanded to the Black Sea, Ukrainian unmanned systems attacked another 42 Russian vessels, including oil tankers, gas carriers, and tugboats.

If this continues, it will become an unprecedented campaign in terms of scale and systematic impact on the maritime logistics of an aggressor state.

Ukrainian strikes are directed not only against warships, but also against elements of the transport system that supports the functioning of russia’s war economy. Tankers, bulk carriers, auxiliary vessels, tugboats, port infrastructure, and logistics routes used to transport energy resources, grain, military cargo, and supply the occupation grouping in Crimea are being targeted.

The military effect is gradually transforming into an economic one.

The cost of a modern tanker can reach $70 million, a large bulk carrier up to $50 million, and a tugboat up to $15 million. However, russia’s principal losses are determined not only by damage to individual vessels. Much more serious consequences include rising insurance premiums, higher freight costs, transportation delays, the need to change routes, and increased expenditure on shipping security.

Experts already estimate the cumulative economic effect at hundreds of millions of dollars, while indirect losses from reduced exports of energy resources and grain could amount to billions of dollars. The impact on Russian grain exports is already being recorded due to restrictions on shipping in the Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov.

For the Kremlin, restoring the safe operation of maritime logistics is now becoming not only a military but also an economic priority.

In response, russia continues systematic strikes against Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdennyi, as well as attacks on civilian commercial vessels operating in the Ukrainian maritime corridor. In effect, Moscow is attempting to compensate for its own losses by applying economic pressure on Ukraine and international shipping.

Therefore, the moratorium proposed by Turkey cannot be limited simply to a cessation of strikes.

If an agreement restricts only Ukraine’s capabilities, russia will gain time to restore transport routes, stabilize the operation of its shadow fleet, increase oil exports, and supply military bases in occupied Crimea. In other words, the very instrument that is currently creating the greatest military-economic pressure on the Kremlin would be put on hold.

Ukraine should propose its own vision of such an agreement.

First, international civilian shipping must be clearly distinguished from russia’s shadow fleet, which is used to circumvent sanctions and finance the war.

Second, an international mechanism for monitoring maritime traffic is needed, with the participation of Turkey and other partners and with the possibility of escorting civilian vessels.

Third, any moratorium must not apply to legitimate military targets: Russian Navy vessels, military logistics, ammunition depots, command posts, and other infrastructure supporting the conduct of the war.

Fourth, the long-term objective of any Black Sea agreements should be the gradual demilitarization of occupied Crimea. Without this, long-term security in the Black Sea will remain unattainable.

Today, Ukraine has the strategic initiative at sea. Ukrainian maritime unmanned systems have become the first in modern history to force a significantly stronger adversary to change the principles governing the use of its fleet and have placed its maritime economy under threat. Surrendering this advantage without receiving genuine reciprocal guarantees would be a serious strategic mistake.

Therefore, Ukraine’s position should be clear: any Black Sea moratorium can be acceptable only if it simultaneously guarantees the safety of international shipping, strengthens international control over maritime transportation, and prevents russia from restoring its military logistics, shadow fleet, and the capabilities of its occupation grouping in Crimea.

Only under these conditions can the diplomatic initiative become an instrument of stability rather than a strategic pause for the aggressor.

Mykola Zentsev, International Security Expert, Founder of a Humanitarian Demining Company, Major General (Ret.)