In the summer of 2022, M142 HIMARS high-mobility artillery rocket systems and M982 Excalibur precision-guided projectiles fundamentally changed the dynamics of combat operations in Ukraine. They destroyed ammunition depots, command posts, and bridges dozens of kilometers behind the front line.

However, over time, the amount of publicly available material and striking footage showing the use of these systems decreased significantly. The question arose in the media and analytical circles: where has the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ main precision weapon gone, and why has its effectiveness changed?

The reality is not that the stock of missiles has been exhausted or that they have been abandoned, but rather that the confrontation has undergone a profound technological transformation, with electronic warfare (EW) moving to the forefront.

The first and main reason is the decline in accuracy due to enemy electronic warfare. The effectiveness of GMLRS munitions (used by HIMARS systems) and M982 Excalibur projectiles is based on a combined guidance system: inertial navigation (INS) plus satellite correction using GPS. In the absence of interference, the Circular Error Probable (CEP) for Excalibur and GMLRS was only 1–3 meters.

However, throughout 2023–2024, the adversary developed a dense, layered electronic suppression environment.

According to classified reports and analytical publications, including The Washington Post:

• The effectiveness of M982 Excalibur reportedly fell from more than 50% hits at the beginning of its use to less than 10%. This forced the Ukrainian Armed Forces to virtually suspend the mass use of these expensive projectiles, with each round costing approximately $100,000.
• GMLRS rockets also began losing satellite signals during the terminal phase of their trajectory, switching solely to the inertial navigation system (INS). When flying exclusively under INS guidance, the error can increase to 10–30 meters, making the munition ineffective for precision strikes against individual armored vehicles or command-and-staff vehicles.

A key factor behind the decline in accuracy was the deployment by russia of operational-tactical and strategic-level electronic warfare systems.

• R-330Zh Zhitel: an automated electronic warfare station capable of completely blocking or distorting GPS signals received by navigation systems, including protected military M-Code signals, within a radius of 20–30 km (and up to 50 km against airborne targets).
• Pole-21: a modular satellite-navigation suppression system. russia has deployed its towers and antennas along the entire line of contact at intervals of approximately 10–15 km, creating a continuous “jamming dome.”

When a HIMARS rocket enters the Zhitel’s area of effect, its satellite receiver is effectively “blinded.” It continues flying using inertial navigation, but loses the “surgical” precision required for highly accurate strikes.

Hunting EW Systems and the Limits of This Approach

Ukraine’s Defense Forces have launched a systematic campaign to hunt down russian electronic warfare systems.

Hunting Zhitel stations using reconnaissance drones, FPV kamikaze drones, and artillery has become a top priority for aerial reconnaissance units.

However, destroying individual EW systems has not solved the problem comprehensively:

• The adversary has put the replacement of lost EW equipment on an industrial-scale production cycle.
• The layered deployment of systems creates redundancy: after one station is destroyed, its sector is covered by neighboring systems.

This has forced Western developers to seek fundamental technical solutions.

The loss of effectiveness of American precision weapons has become a challenge not only for Ukraine but also for the U.S. defense industry itself. To restore Ukraine’s capabilities and protect its own doctrine, the Pentagon launched a major modernization effort involving Digital Anti-Jam Antennas (DIGAR / AJANT). BAE Systems and other contractors began integrating new multi-element antennas with controlled radiation patterns (CRPA).

These systems create “nulls” in the direction of ground-based sources of interference and receive signals primarily from satellites overhead.

The software and algorithms used by GMLRS rockets have also been updated to detect “spoofing” (the falsification of coordinates) and automatically filter out false signals generated by russian electronic warfare systems.

The tactics of employment have also changed. Because shorter engagement distances are required to preserve accuracy, HIMARS crews have been forced to operate closer to the front line. This, however, has increased the risk of detection by russian reconnaissance UAVs and attacks by kamikaze drones, including fiber-optic-controlled FPV drones.

As a conclusion for those interested in modern weaponry, HIMARS have not disappeared. They have evolved from an instrument of “easy and unpunished strikes” during the first stage of the war into an element of a complex counter-battery and operational strike system.

Today, every GMLRS launch is a complex operation:

• First, reconnaissance detects and locates enemy EW activity.
• Fire or electronic suppression is conducted against Zhitel / Pole-21 stations.
• Only then is the strike carried out using jamming-resistant missiles.

The story of HIMARS and Excalibur demonstrates the main lesson of this war: no high-tech “silver bullet” remains an ultimate solution forever. Modern warfare is a continuous cycle of “action and counteraction,” in which technological superiority is measured not in months but in weeks, requiring constant adaptation both on the battlefield and in design bureaus.