Ukraine is entering the winter of 2026/27 without signs of an imminent financial crisis, but with a dangerous combination of risks: the war continues, military spending remains enormous, economic growth is weak, and the budget is critically dependent on external financing.

Therefore, the main question for the coming months is not the hryvnia exchange rate. The key issue is whether the state will have enough resources to simultaneously finance the war, social commitments and the economy without returning to monetary financing.

Finance Minister Serhii Marchenko has already identified the key figure: Ukraine needs around $50 billion in external financing annually, while the preliminary uncovered financing need for 2027 stands at $32.6 billion.

€90 billion in European support

The EU has approved €90 billion in loan support for Ukraine for 2026-2027. But this is not €90 billion that the government can freely use to cover budget gaps.

Around €30 billion is earmarked for macro-financial support, while €60 billion is intended for defense needs and weapons procurement.

There is another fundamental condition. European financing is directly linked to reforms, the rule of law and the fight against corruption.

That is why corruption scandals are no longer merely an internal political or reputational issue. They can become a factor of economic security if they lead to delays in reforms, program reviews or disbursements.

A complete suspension of European support is unlikely. A much more realistic risk is a delay in funding precisely when the budget needs it most.

Winter 2026/27: the first test

The baseline scenario remains manageable. International financing continues, the NBU supports the foreign exchange market, and the state finances the military and its core social commitments.

However, the room for other expenditures will shrink.

In the event of cash-flow gaps, the government will first postpone capital and non-critical expenditures. The next step will be to increase domestic borrowing through domestic government bonds.

The most dangerous threshold is a return to systematic monetary financing of the deficit. At that point, the budget problem begins to transform into a currency and inflation problem.

For the population, this would mean more expensive imported goods, fuel, medicines, equipment and services. Even with a relatively controlled exchange rate, real incomes could decline because of inflation.

Spring 2027: the point of truth

The most important period may be March-June 2027.

By then, it will become clear how much of the budget’s external financing need has been covered, whether Ukraine is meeting its partners’ conditions, and whether the continuation of the war requires another increase in defense spending.

The IMF has already recorded delays in some structural reforms. At the same time, the Fund continues its program and, following its review in July, provided Ukraine with another tranche of approximately $690 million.

The main risk will emerge if several factors converge at the same time: the continuation of the war, increased military needs, new attacks on the energy sector, weaker tax revenues and delays in external financing.

This would trigger a dangerous chain:

less external funding → budget cash-flow gaps → more domestic borrowing → higher borrowing costs → pressure on the hryvnia → more expensive imports → higher inflation → declining real incomes.

This is no longer just a question of the exchange rate, but of the state’s economic resilience.

Three scenarios for 2027

Resilience scenario. Ukraine fulfills the main EU and IMF conditions, while partners cover its financing needs. The hryvnia gradually weakens, inflation remains noticeable, but the financial system remains stable.

Budget stress scenario. Reforms and individual disbursements are delayed, while military needs increase. The government postpones civilian expenditures and increases domestic borrowing. Depreciation and inflationary pressures intensify, while real household incomes decline.

Crisis scenario. A significant external financing gap coincides with a deterioration in the military and energy situation. Domestic borrowing is insufficient. A return to monetary financing then becomes a real threat, sharply increasing risks to the hryvnia, prices and financial stability.

At present, this is a risk, not a forecast.

Five warning indicators

Over the next nine months, it is worth watching not so much exchange offices as five indicators: the schedule of external disbursements, the volume of the NBU’s international reserves, budget execution, the volume of domestic borrowing, and Ukraine’s compliance with EU and IMF conditions.

If three or four of these indicators deteriorate simultaneously, this would signal a shift from the resilience scenario toward budget stress.

The money is there. The question is whether Ukraine can retain access to it

This is the main paradox of 2027.

The EU has created a €90 billion support mechanism. The IMF continues financing. Europe is not showing an intention to leave Ukraine without resources during the war.

But international financing is increasingly tied to reforms, transparency and anti-corruption commitments.

Therefore, one of Ukraine’s main economic risks in 2027 may not be a lack of money among its partners, but Ukraine’s ability to maintain uninterrupted access to that money.

Winter 2026/27 will be the first test. Spring 2027 will reveal the Ukrainian economy’s real margin of resilience.